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categorized into four sub-categories: 
Identity, Route, Location and Data  privacy. Achieving 
full network level privacy is a challenging problem due to the 
conditions imposed by the sensor nodes (e.g., energy, 
memory and computation power), sensor networks (e.g., 
mobility and topology) and QoS issues (e.g., packet reach-
ability and timeliness). This proposed paper consists of two 
algorithms IRL algorithm and data privacy mechanism that 
addresses this problem. The proposed system provides 
additional trustworthiness, less computation power, less 
storage space and more reliability. Also, we proved that our 
proposed solutions provide protection against various privacy 
disclosure attacks, such as eavesdropping and hop-by-hop 
trace back attacks. 
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n order to present the adversary from back-tracing, 
the route, location and data privacy mechanism must 
be enforced. With the spreading application of 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) in various sensitive 
areas such as health-care, military, habitat monitoring, 
etc. Network level privacy often been categorized into 4 
categories: 
1) Sender node identity privacy: no intermediate node 
can get any information about who is sending the 
packets except the source, its immediate neighbors 
and the destination. 
2) Sender node location privacy: no intermediate node 
can have any information about the location (in 
terms of physical distance or number of hops) 
about the sender node except the source, its 
immediate neighbors and the destination. 
3) Route privacy: no node can predict the information 
about the complete path (from source to 
destination). Also, a mobile adversary gets no clue 
to trace back the source node either from the 
contents and/or directional information of the 
captured packet(s). 
4) Data packet privacy: no node can see the 
information inside in a payload of the data packet 
except the source and the destination. 
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An energy-efficient privacy solution is needed to 
address these patterns in Wireless Sensor Network. 
Advanced features in cryptographic system were 
introduced in this paper are: 
 A new Identity, Route and Location (IRL) privacy 
algorithm is proposed that ensures    the source, 
identity and location. This algorithm allows the 
packets to destination only through trusted 
intermediate nodes. 
 The extension of our proposed IRL algorithm is a 
new reliable Identity, Route and Location (r-IRL) 
privacy algorithm. This algorithm has the ability to 
forward packets from multiple secure paths to 
increase the packet reach-ability. 
 A data privacy mechanism is used to unique in the 
sense that it provides secure data and packet 
authentication. 
Network and Assumptions Model  
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is composed 
of large number of small sensor nodes that are of limited 
resource and densely deployed in an environment. This 
sensor node uses IEEE 802.11 standard link layer 
protocol, which keeps packets in its cache until the 
sender receives an acknowledgment (ACK). The sender 
node will retransmit the packet, if the ACK does not 
receive within threshold. 
Figure 1.
 
Typical WSN scenario.
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a) Concepts And Definitions
The proposed algorithms use two notions:  
Direction and Trust. These notions are used to provide 
  
 
  
reliable secure paths for achieving robust route privacy. 
Direction helps to forward packet to the destination in a 
timely manner and trust will help to forward the packets 
via reliable nodes.
 
Direction
 
: The first notion used in our 
algorithms is that of direction. The physical location of 
the base station is the reference point for each sensor 
node. Based on this reference point, each node 
classifies its neighboring nodes into four categories: (1) 
forward neighboring nodes (F), (2) right side backward 
neighboring nodes (Br), (3) left side backward 
neighboring nodes (Bl), and (4) middle backward 
neighboring nodes (Bm). The objective of this 
categorization is to provide more path diversity as 
discussed in Section 4.2. A node x classifies its 
neighboring node y in following fashion:
 
 
where θ
 
is the angle between the node x and its 
neighboring node y with respect to the line joining node 
x and the base station as shown in Figure 2.
 
Figure 2.
 
Neighbor node classification
 
  
  
Trust
 
:
 
The second notion used in our 
algorithms is that of trust. The definition of a trust here is 
based on our other paper and restated here. A node 
can be classified into one of the three categories: 
trustworthy, untrustworthy, and uncertain. A node is 
considered trustworthy if it interacts successfully most of 
the time with the other nodes. A node is considered 
untrustworthy if it tries to do as many unsuccessful 
interactions as possible with the other nodes. An 
untrustworthy node could be a faulty or malicious node. 
A node is considered uncertain if it performs both 
successful and unsuccessful interactions. Detailed 
definition if the successful and unsuccessful interactions 
and trust calculation methodology is available in our 
paper and provided here in a simplified form.
 
A sender will consider an interaction successful 
if the sender receives confirmation that the packet is 
successfully received by the neighbor node and 
forwarded towards the destination in an unaltered 
fashion. The first requirement of successful reception is 
achieved on the reception of the link layer 
acknowledgment (ACK). The second requirement of 
forwarding towards the destination is achieved with the 
help of enhanced passive acknowledgment (PACK) by 
overhearing the transmission of a next hop on the route, 
since they are within the radio range. If the sender node 
does not overhear the retransmission of the packet 
within a threshold time from its neighboring node or if 
the overheard packet is found to be illegally fabricated 
(by comparing the payload that is attached to the 
packet), then the sender node will consider that 
interaction as unsuccessful.
 
With this simple approach, several attacks can 
be prevented, i.e., the black hole attack is 
straightforwardly detected when malicious node drops 
the incoming packets and keeps sending self-generated 
packets .Similarly, sink hole attack, an advanced version 
of the black hole attack, is also easily detectable by 
looking at the passive acknowledgment. Likewise, the 
selective forwarding attack and gray-hole attack [27] 
can also be eliminated with the aid of above mentioned 
approach. Based on these successful and unsuccessful 
interactions node x can calculate the trust value of node 
y in following fashion:
 
 
where [.] is the nearest integer function, Sx,y
 
is 
the total number of successful interactions of node x 
with y during time δt, and Ux,y
 
is the total number of 
unsuccessful interactions of node x with y during time δt. 
After calculating trust value, a node will quantize trust 
into three states as follows:
 
 
where, f represents half of the average values of 
all trustworthy nodes and g represents one-third of he 
average values of all untrustworthy nodes. Both f and g 
are calculated as follows:
 
 
 
The steady-state operation, these values can 
change with every passing unit of time which creates 
dynamic trust boundaries. After each passage of time, 
∆t, nodes will recalculate the values of f and g. This trust 
calculation procedure will continue in this fashion.
 
The time window length (∆t) could be made 
shorter or longer based on the network analysis 
scenarios. If ∆t is too short, then the calculated trust 
value may not reflect the reliable behavior. On the other 
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hand, if it is too long, then it will consume too much 
memory to store the interaction record at the sensor 
node. Therefore, various parameters can be used to 
adjust the length of ∆t.
where [.] is the nearest integer function, Rx 
  
 
 
represents the set of trustworthy nodes for node x, Mx 
the set of untrustworthy nodes for node x, and n is the 
total number of nodes that contains trustworthy, 
untrustworthy and uncertain nodes. The initial trust 
values of all nodes are 50.The values of f and g are 
adaptive. 
 
b)
 
Identity, Route, and Location Privacy (IRL)
 
      The   proposed  identity,  route  and location 
privacy scheme works in two phases. The first is 
neighbor node state initialization phase, and the second 
is routing phase.
 
Route Privacy
 
: In initialization phase, let the 
node i have m neighboring nodes in which t nodes are 
trusted. So, 0 ≤ t ≤ m and M(t) = M(tF ) ∪
 
M(tBr ) ∪
 
M(tBl) ∪
 
M(tBm). Here M(tF ), M(tBr ),M(tBl), and M(tBm) 
represent the set of trusted nodes that are in the 
forward, right backward, left backward, and middle 
backward directions, respectively. These neighbor sets 
(M(tF ), M(tBr ), M(tBl),and M(tBm)) are initialized and
updated whenever a change occur in neighborhood. For 
example, the entrance of a new node, change of a trust 
value, etc.
 
Whenever a node needs to forward a packet, 
the routing phase for source node and for intermediate 
node) of IRL algorithm is called.
 
Whenever a source node wants to forwards the 
packet, it will first check the availability of the trusted 
neighboring nodes in its forward direction setM(tF ). If 
trusted
 
nodes exists then it will randomly select one 
node as a next hop from the setM(tF ) and forward the 
packet towards it .If there is no trusted node in its 
forward direction, then the source node will check the 
availability of a trusted node in the right (M(tBr )) and left 
(M(tBl)) backward sets. If the trusted nodes are available 
then the source node will randomly select one node as a 
next hop from these sets and forward the packet 
towards it.If the trusted node does not exist in these sets 
either, then the
 
source node will randomly select one 
trusted node from the backward middle set (M(tBm)) 
and forward the packet towards it.If there are no trusted 
nodes available in all of the sets then the packet will be 
dropped .
 
When an intermediate node receives the packet 
(either from the source node or from another en-route 
node), it will first check whether the packet is new or 
old.If it is new, then the node will first check the 
availability of the trusted node from the forward direction 
set (MF ) excluding the prevhop node if it belongs to 
forward set.If trusted nodes exists in the forward set then 
the node will randomly select any one trusted node as a 
next hop and forward the packet towards it. If there is no 
trusted node available in the forward direction, then it 
will check to which set the sender of the packet belongs 
to. For example, If the packet, forwarded by a node, 
belongs to the right backward set, then it will first check 
whether the left or middle backward sets contain any 
trusted nodes. If so, it will randomly select one node 
from those sets and forward the packet towards it. If 
there is no trusted node in those two sets, then the node 
will randomly select a trusted node from the right 
backward set (M(tBr )) excluding the one from which the 
node received the current packet  and forward the 
packet towards it.Similar operations will be performed, if 
the packet, forwarded by a node, belongs to the left and 
middle backward or forward sets. An example IRL 
routing scenario is shown in Figure 3.
 
Figure 3.
 
Sample routing scenario of IRL scheme.
 
 
This routing strategy may result in the creation 
of a cycle (loop). However, due to the randomness in 
the selection of the next-hop and the presence of the 
different four direction sets, the probability of creation of 
any cycle is very low. Nevertheless, in order to fully avoid 
the occurrence of the cycles, each node (prior to 
forwarding of a packet) will save the signature of the 
packet in the buffer for the δt time,that is:
 
 
where D is the distance between the forwarding 
node and the base station, d is the distance between 
the forwarding node and the next hop, and pt is the 
propagation transfer time between the forwarding node 
and the next hop. This signature consists of two fields: 
(1) sequence number of the packet, and (2) the 
payload. The potential of the signature to compare and 
identify the same packet is detailed in the later section. 
Corresponding to this signature, three more fields are 
also stored in the buffer:
 
1)
 
previous hop identity, 
 
2)
 
next hop identity where the packet is forwarded, and 
 
3)
 
counter, that tells how many times the same packet 
is received by the node. This information will later be 
used to get rid of any cycle. The size of the buffer is 
mainly dependent on the network traffic
 
conditions. 
However, it is expected to be low due because the 
sensor nodes sent data either in periodic intervals or 
upon the occurrence of some event.
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Figure 4. Three sample cycle detection and prevention 
scenarios. 
 
If the node received the packet whose signature 
exists in the buffer, then including the previous hop 
node , two other nodes will also be excluded from the 
selection of the next hop process: 1) the node from 
which last time the packet was received the node from 
which last time the packet was forwarded. If the same 
packet is received three times by the same node then 
the packet will be dropped. Three sample scenarios of 
the loop creation, detection and prevention are shown in 
Figure 4. Creation of loops and traversing of the packets 
in the backward direction is not a completely negative 
effect. Rather, it provides positive effects in terms of 
strengthening the route and source location privacy, 
because these effects will helps to increase the safety 
period, which is the time for an adversary to reach at the 
source node. 
Identity Privacy: Whenever a node receives the 
packet p from the source node or en-route node then 
the receiving node will replace the previous hop‘s 
identity prevhop contained in the packet with its 
own.After that, the node will get the next forwarding 
node nexthop and update the header of the packet p = 
{prevhop, nexthop, payload}. After modification of the 
two header fields, the node will forward the packet.In 
this way, all the intermediate forwarding nodes replace 
the source and next hop‘s identity contained in the 
packet p. This process will go on until the packet 
reaches the base station. 
Location Privacy: The neighboring nodes which 
are in each other‘s radio range can easily approximate 
the location of each other by measuring the received 
signal strength and the angle of arrival.If the adversary is 
within the range of the source node, then adversary can 
easily estimate the location of the source. Once the 
packet has crossed the radio range of the original 
source node, then becomes very difficult for an attacker 
to estimate the location of the node either in terms of the 
physical distance or in terms of the number of hops of 
an original source node. The main reason for this is that 
the path selection is random and packets are forwarded 
by only trusted nodes which only contain the information 
of the last and the next hop. 
c) Reliable Identity, Route, And Location Privacy (R-
IRL) 
It is also possible that some applications require 
more reliability in terms of packet reach-ability; and the 
packet could be dropped due to either network 
congestion or malicious behavior of an en-route node. 
Thus, in order to achieve more reliability, the packet 
should be forwarded from multiple paths 
simultaneously, which will give trustworthiness in the 
sense that at least the packet should reach the base 
station by any one of the paths, although, this may 
increase some communication overhead. Our reliable 
IRL (r-IRL) algorithm is the extended version of our 
proposed IRL algorithm, in which we introduce one 
more parameter, reliability r. The source node i will multi-
cast a packet to all r randomly selected neighboring 
trusted nodes that are in the forward direction. If there 
are no adequate trusted nodes present in the forward 
direction, then it will select the remaining trusted nodes 
from the backward direction. The rest of the mechanism 
of the r-IRL algorithm is the same as the IRL algorithm. 
d) Data Privacy 
The payload contains the identity of the source 
node (IDx) and the actual data (d). Identity is encrypted 
with the public key (k+bs) of the base station and data 
is encrypted with the secret key (kx,bs)shared between 
the sender node and the BS. Both are appended with 
the payload as shown below: 
payload = [E(IDx, k+ bs),E(d, kx,bs)] 
If we assume that the adversary knows the 
range of identities assigned to the sensor nodes, public 
key of the base station and information about cipher 
algorithm used in the network, an adversary can then 
successfully obtain the identity of the source by 
performing simple brute-force search attack by 
comparing the pattern of encrypted identity with a 
known range of identities. Therefore in order to provide 
protection against brute-force search attack, we append 
a random number (Rn) (equivalent to the size of identity) 
with the identity of a node and then perform encryption. 
Now the payload is: 
payload = [E(IDx||Rn, k+bs),E(d, kx,bs)] 
where || is the append operation. Inclusion of 
random number may introduce additional computational 
overhead. However, the amount of overhead is mainly 
dependent on random number generation technique. 
Recently, very nice random generation techniques have 
been specially designed for low power sensor networks, 
such as. These techniques could be used to generate 
random number for each packet. Also, overall 
computational overhead is dependent on the number of 
packets generated by the sensor nodes.  
Our proposed data privacy approach provides 
several benefits. Firstly, data secrecy is achieved in the 
presence of identity anonymity. This feature is not 
available in earlier proposed privacy  schemes. 
Secondly, the base station will receive both the identity 
of the actual source node and message authentication. 
If the packet has been successfully decrypted with the 
shared secret key, it means that packet is received from 
genuine sensor node. 
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a) Energy Consumption Analysis                     
This section, shows the efficiency of our routing 
strategies with existing schemes. Energy is computed 
based on the communication overhead (including 
transmission and reception cost, path length) 
introduced by our proposed routing protocols and 
compared it with other existing schemes. 
 
Table 4. Simulation parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The proposed paper  has implemented our IRL 
and r-IRL routing schemes on Sensor Network Simulator 
and Emulator (SENSE).At the application layer we used 
constant bit rate component (CBR) that generate 
constant traffic during simulation between randomly 
selected source node(s) and the base station. For the 
simplicity, assume that both sensor nodes and the base 
station are static. Network consists of 300 sensor nodes 
that are organized into 15 by 20 grid manner. 
 
      Comparison of proposed IRL and r-IRL 
algorithms with the four variations of phantom routing 
schemes that are:
 
1.
 
Phantom single path routing scheme with hop-
based approach (PSR-hop).
 
2.
 
Phantom single path routing scheme with sector-
based approach (PSR-sec).
 
3.
 
Phantom flood routing scheme with hop-based 
approach (PFR-hop).
 
4.
 
Phantom flood routing scheme with sector-based 
approach (PFR-sec).
 
Figure 6.
 
Energy consumption analysis: simulation time: 
5,000.
 
 
(a).Source node 5
 
 
(b).Source node 10
 
 
The energy consumption analysis with different 
scenarios are shown in Figure 6. For the r-IRL
 
scheme 
we select r = 3, which means a single packet will reach 
the destination via three different
 
routes simultaneously. 
For phantom routing schemes, we select parameter 
hwalk=10 (as recommended. Figure 6
 
clearly indicates 
that, the IRL and r-IRL schemes consume less energy as 
compared to the PSR-sec, PFR-hop and PFR-sec 
schemes but slightly consume higher energy as 
compared to the PSR-hop scheme. This is due to the 
fact that the IRL and r-IRL algorithms provides more 
path diversity and packets sometimes took longer 
paths.
 
Our proposed routing strategies (IRL and r-IRL) 
have both features. Because of the concept of direction 
(Section 3.1), proposed schemes provide more length 
variation and because of the randomness(Section 3.2) 
proposed schemes provide high path variation. 
Incorporation of both features offer high path diversity.
 
© 2012 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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specific Distance b/w nodes 50 units 
Mobility of nodes zero 
Node 
Sensor node’s Initial battery 
1 × 106J 
Power consumption for 
trans. 
1.6W 
Power consumption for recv. 1.2 W 
specific 
Idle power consumption 1.15W 
Carrier sense threshold 3.65e−10W 
Receive power threshold 1.55e−11W 
Frequency 9.14e8 
Trans. & Recv. antenna gain 1.0 
Protocol & Application CBR 
Application 
specific 
Reliability param. 
r for r-
IRL 
3 
hwalk param. for PFR & PSR 10 
Figure 7. Path diversity of privacy schemes.
  
  
 
 
    
 
In order to analyze the path diversity behavior, 
assume 300 sensor nodes in a 10 by 30 grid manner. In 
the simulation, a single source node (ID: 224) generates 
100 data packets for the base station. Figure shows 
the path diversity (in terms of path length) of the IRL, 
PSR-hop and PSR-sec schemes. 
 
The average path taken by the PSR-hop, IRL 
and PSR-sec is 22.12, 36.81 and 38.17, respectively. It 
indicates that the IRL scheme incurs more delay as 
compared with the PSR-hop scheme and less delay as 
compared with the PSR-sec scheme. This figure also 
indicates that the IRL scheme has more path variation 
as compared with the other schemes, which creates 
more difficulties for the adversary to trace back the 
source from the captured packets.
 
Figure 7
 
also shows that some packets took 
longer paths in the IRL scheme as compared with 
others. This is due to the fact that the source or en-route 
node did not find any trusted node in its forward 
direction, so the packet is relayed back in the backward 
direction.  
 
Figure 8
 
shows the result of 100 simulation runs 
in each node has equal probability to be trusted and un-
trusted. It shows that, as the neighborhood size 
increases, the probability of the packet to move in the 
backward direction decreases sharply. 
 
 
Figure 8.
 
Probability of a packet to move in the 
backward direction.
 
 
Existing privacy schemes of WSNs only 
provides partial network level privacy. Providing full 
network level privacy is a critical and challenging issue 
due to the constraints imposed by the sensor nodes 
(e.g.,energy, memory and computation power), sensor 
network (e.g., mobility and topology) and QoS issues 
(e.g., packet reach ability and timeliness). Therefore, in 
this paper we proposed the first full network level privacy 
solution that is composed of two new identity, route and 
location privacy algorithms and data privacy 
mechanism. Our solutions provide additional 
trustworthiness and reliability at modest cost of energy 
and memory. Future work, will evaluate proposed 
schemes from the perspective of computation cost that 
is required to perform encryption and random number 
generation.
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